The Ukrainian strain of nationalism

It is often stated that the Ukrainians only react to the Russian interference in their east whereas the causes of conflict are two-directional. The east of the country is predominantly concerned with the Ukrainian nationalism. The residents in the east complain that they are required to recognize the dominant status of the Ukrainian language and to accept as theirs such western Ukrainian heroes as Stepan Bandera. This complaint has merit.

The Ukrainian type of nationalism is peculiar. It proves its value building on the perceived inferiority of its “Russian brethren.” The title of a major book written by the former president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma – Why Ukraine is not Russia – introduces this argument in open. The main idea of the book is that the “Ukrainians” are more civilized than the “Russians” without defining the terms. Then, the author explains that as he compares different parts of Ukraine, he observes that the western Ukraine (Galicia) is, in his opinion, the most “European”, or developed, region. Its architecture is distinctly European that is similar to the architecture of adjacent Poland. Technologies are advanced. People are polite and support one another. On the other end of the geographic spectrum lies the eastern Ukraine (Donbass) that the author considers to be truly “Russian.” It has the same shoddy Soviet-type architecture like across the border. Its industries are dilapidated. People are rough and careless for one another. In short, Galicia represents for the author the most “European”, or civilized, part of the country when compared with Donbass, or the most “Asian”, backward, region.

The conclusion follows that to become truly “European”, the whole of Ukraine should become like Galicia. But what does it mean practically? The Ukrainian nationalism answers this question cunningly: ‘Become the Ukrainian. Speak Ukrainian like the residents of Galicia and behave as they do. Then, you will become as civilized as they are.’ The appeal of this simple answer is strong among the Ukrainian residents who already speak Ukrainian at home and, hence, do not face the cost of learning another language. But the urban dwellers and residents of predominantly Russian-speaking eastern provinces are more skeptical. They question what the benefit is changing their way of speaking and thinking. The Ukrainian nationalism replies: ‘Do not compare two worlds. The Russian culture might have its own attraction but do not forget that it was imposed upon you through the occupation. In reality, you are Ukrainians who have forgotten your culture under the influence of the Russian masters. Come back to become Europeans as we are. It might take time to learn the language but, in between, you can easily accept other Ukrainian values such as our national literary pieces, dress code, and our heroes.’ If the residents still hesitate rejecting the Russian culture, the Ukrainian nationalism condemns them either as unwelcome descendants of Russian colonists or as cultural “Asians” persisting in their incivility.

The argument of Ukrainian cultural superiority over the Russians forms the basis of political discourse in this country. It lies at the heart of Ukrainian desire to join every Western-led institution – be it WTO, EU, or NATO – at least ahead if not at exclusion of Russia even at the expense of its national interests. The problem with this argument is that it is flawed. Formally, it is based at two premises and a conclusion:

1)      Galicia speaks only Ukrainian and has specific values;

2)      Galicia is the most developed Ukrainian region;

3)      Therefore, other Ukrainian regions should speak only Ukrainian and to accept specifically Galician values to become developed.

The conclusion does not follow from the premises suggesting the non sequitur fallacy. Even accepting the fact that Galicia is the most developed Ukrainian region – other regions like Dnipropetrovsk or Odessa might be better candidates – the language and cultural values are unlikely causes of development as people in former European colonies (e.g. India or Algeria) who accepted the colonial language and the way of living can attest. A more plausible explanation is that Galicia was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, as such, it bears the signs of its colonial past that happened to be – in the eyes of Ukrainian nationalists – more glorious than in other Ukrainian regions.

In the time of peace, the Ukrainian strain of nationalism is not without certain charm in its promotion of “all-Ukrainian values.” Glorification of local songs or garments is an important and colorful part of local folklore. Its less benign features can be annoying but tolerable: being mocked as a ‘moskal’ is the worst treatment that the pro-Russian residents can expect for their allegiance to a different culture. However, in the time of war that has started after the Russia’s annexation of Crimea, such ridicule has quickly degenerated in something more menacing – the dehumanization by Ukrainian nationalists of their opponents.