I have not updated this site since July for the following reason: the events developed as predicted making unnecessary a new post. Ukraine tried to crush the rebellious Donbass, but as soon as its army saw glimpses of victory, the third force appeared and preserved the status quo. Then, the Ukrainian power went broke and the Donbass units were, in their turn, on the verge of decimating their opponent's demoralized troops. Again, the third force intervened and denied the Donbass its victory.
This sequence of events was still supportive of my previous argument that Mr. Putin was ambivalent regarding what side in the conflict to take. On one hand, he could not ignore the anti-Russian rhetoric emanating from what was once a key bastion of Russian Empire (the east and south of Ukraine called, sometimes, Novorossia). As the president of Russia, Mr. Putin was obliged to show who calls the shots in the area. On the other hand, he is more comfortable cutting backroom deals with oligarchs - be they of Russian or Ukrainian vintage - or fighting for the "just" place in the Washington-led international pecking order rather than charging bravely against the "enemies of Mother Russia" on the fields of Donbass. As a result, Mr. Putin vacillated between supporting this or other side and his non-committal policy culminated in the Minsk accords that froze the Ukrainian divide along the line that did not satisfy either party (Ukraine and Donbass) of the conflict. It was expected that the truce did not last long and that Donbass was more likely to attack Ukraine to recapture the cities it lost during summer 2014.
The months of October and November have passed, but the envisioned attack has not materialized. The truce took an excessively long pause to stay a part of the previous plan that envisioned the gradual Kyiv's submission to the new reality. In fact, the Ukrainian president Mr. Poroshenko appeared to be drifting towards a backstage deal with Moscow, but such accord was not reached.
Since the previous analysis did not predict this failure, it needs to be updated using new information. It becomes valid again, if another conflict - between Russia and the USA - takes prevalence over the original conflict between Russia and EU over Ukraine. In that case, the battlefield expands. Ukrainian theater of operations becomes subsidiary and, possibly, a trap laid for America in the case that the USA supports militarily its weakened ally in Kyiv.
According to this logic, the main action from now on will take place at another theater. Possibly, it will be Europe. Ms. Merkel has become unusually politically pro-active (and anti-Russian) at the expense of German companies wanting to continue 'business as usual' with Russia. Her activism may be a sign that Germany has been granted the 'go ahead' permission to reassert its power in Europe and in Eastern Europe (including Ukraine), in particular. In that case, the ball is on the German side.
This sequence of events was still supportive of my previous argument that Mr. Putin was ambivalent regarding what side in the conflict to take. On one hand, he could not ignore the anti-Russian rhetoric emanating from what was once a key bastion of Russian Empire (the east and south of Ukraine called, sometimes, Novorossia). As the president of Russia, Mr. Putin was obliged to show who calls the shots in the area. On the other hand, he is more comfortable cutting backroom deals with oligarchs - be they of Russian or Ukrainian vintage - or fighting for the "just" place in the Washington-led international pecking order rather than charging bravely against the "enemies of Mother Russia" on the fields of Donbass. As a result, Mr. Putin vacillated between supporting this or other side and his non-committal policy culminated in the Minsk accords that froze the Ukrainian divide along the line that did not satisfy either party (Ukraine and Donbass) of the conflict. It was expected that the truce did not last long and that Donbass was more likely to attack Ukraine to recapture the cities it lost during summer 2014.
The months of October and November have passed, but the envisioned attack has not materialized. The truce took an excessively long pause to stay a part of the previous plan that envisioned the gradual Kyiv's submission to the new reality. In fact, the Ukrainian president Mr. Poroshenko appeared to be drifting towards a backstage deal with Moscow, but such accord was not reached.
Since the previous analysis did not predict this failure, it needs to be updated using new information. It becomes valid again, if another conflict - between Russia and the USA - takes prevalence over the original conflict between Russia and EU over Ukraine. In that case, the battlefield expands. Ukrainian theater of operations becomes subsidiary and, possibly, a trap laid for America in the case that the USA supports militarily its weakened ally in Kyiv.
According to this logic, the main action from now on will take place at another theater. Possibly, it will be Europe. Ms. Merkel has become unusually politically pro-active (and anti-Russian) at the expense of German companies wanting to continue 'business as usual' with Russia. Her activism may be a sign that Germany has been granted the 'go ahead' permission to reassert its power in Europe and in Eastern Europe (including Ukraine), in particular. In that case, the ball is on the German side.
