Does the US policy benefit the Ukrainian rebels?

It might sound provocative but the answer to this question is 'yes'. To see the logic of the argument one needs to know the superposition  principle from physics and the concept of non-linear war introduced by writer Nathan Dubovitsky, aka Vladislav Surkov who is the most intellectual adviser to Russian President Putin.

The first principle states that the end result of an applied force may be very different from its intended consequence because it is the combined effect of ALL forces that matters. The second idea claims that the modern war is so complicated that each participant is better off pursuing his or her objectives independently from anybody rather than adhering to a stable coalition of allies. In short, the non-linear war is Hobbesian at its finest where friends can betray and enemies can join forces in an instant. Let apply the two concepts to the Ukrainian case.

As I have mentioned earlier (see Who controls the eastern Ukrainian separatists?), the Kremlin is not in hurry to help the rebels because it does not exercise full control over them. For example, while the Ukrainian military repeats that their opponents are extremely well equipped; Igor Strelkov, the field commander in Donetsk, complains about being overwhelmingly outgunned by his enemies. The two statements seem to contradict one another but they both can be true.

The front line reports constantly mention the mysterious "third force" that helps selectively the separatists but only at the time and in the place that it considers to be appropriate. This force is commonly associated with Russian special units but the reality can be more complicated. The "third force" may in itself be a complex combination of several independent forces applied with different objectives - exactly in compliance with the concept of non-linear war. Soldiers on the ground from the Ukrainian side suspect their commanders to share information about their movements with the enemy. The rebels report that the Ukrainian National Guard units fight with the Ukrainian Army while their opponents notice clashes among the rebel formations. Who is then fighting whom, under what circumstances and for which objectives?

To answer this question, one needs to establish a frame of reference to separate the dimension of forces. In my opinion, the most distinct interests lie within a two-coordinate frame formed by the idea of socialism/nationalism on one axis versus the idea of hierarchy/globalism measured on the other axis. Along the first line the Russian nationalists fight their Ukrainian counterparts and the leftists advance their opposing visions of 'social justice'. Along the second line the Russian, EU and US elites define their rankings within the global hierarchy of power. Then, it becomes visible that the Washington's insistence on downgrading the ranking of Russian elite (for their "meddling in the Ukrainian affairs") along one axis works towards raising the Ukrainian rebels' chances to succeed along the other axis.

The problem is that up to now Mr. Putin has worked against the rebels due to his deep-seated their distrust. Being a functionary who has climbed the career ladder under the condition of unswayed loyalty, he is psychologically unprepared to ally with charismatic 'grassroots' politicians. For him the leaders of rebellion are pesky upstarts who need to be constantly reminded of who is their real boss. This personal trait explains why the trailblazers who risked the most in the beginning (Messrs. Pushilin, Khodakovsky, possibly Boroday) are gradually replaced with retired security personnel like Mr. Antyufeev and why such charismatic field commanders as Messrs. Strelkov and Mozgovoy are allowed to lose in Slavyansk and Severodonetsk.

If not for the US intervention, the Ukrainian drama would most likely result in modest reshuffling of relative weights of individual members of Russo-Ukrainian elite. Roughly speaking, certain assets in Ukraine would change the ownership to better reflect the new power disposition after February 2014 and, possibly, Russia and Ukraine would agree on the joint management of Crimea.

The recent events, such as the Malasyan plane accident and the ruling of Hague Court on the expropriation of Yukos, have put significant downward pressure on the Russian elite. Figuratively speaking, Mr. Putin and his friends have been given a 'death card' regarding their ranking in the global hierarchy of elites. Being virtual outcasts, they cannot anymore cut a deal with their Ukrainian opponents who - in their wildest dreams - have already imagined themselves being promoted at the expense of defeated Russians. But there is a glitch. Facing a powerful attack from the top of global wealth pyramid, Mr. Putin and his circle are obliged to seek help from the bottom that is to join forces with nationalistic (Mr. Strelkov) or socialistic (Mr. Mozgovoy) field commanders in eastern Ukraine.

Thus, the current US policy of punishing Mr. Putin and his inner circle objectively strengthens the position of Ukrainian rebels.

News from the oligarchic front in Ukraine

Analytically, there is insufficient information to conclude what the latest round of oligarchic squabbles in Ukraine leads to. Nevertheless, new facts, taken together, shed light on the emerging political disposition in this country. Potentially, the centrifugal force that initiated in Kiev last February has acquired sufficient strength to break the state forever. But let me mention the context before proceeding with the facts.

As I have mentioned before (see Creeping decentralization of Ukraine), Dnipropetrovsk governor Ihor Kolomoyskyi is a maverick oligarch who has broken the rules of the game played by the Ancien Régime in Kyiv. Apparently, his refusal to follow the rules - which can be a witty move as this chess game develops - has worried President Poroshenko (and supporting him oligarchs, most of all Dmitro Firtash and Rinat Akhmetov) so much that the latter may feel now that Mr. Kolomoyskyi is a greater threat to his group than the Donbass separatists. A few facts point in this direction.

July 8: the TV channel "Inter" broadcast a film that blamed Mr. Kolomoyskyi for, among his other sins, the creation of "private battalions." The channel belongs to Mr. Firtash who is currently on bail in Vienna waiting for his extradition, on the U.S. request, hearing to be completed. Other media attacks have been reported as well.

July 7: Mr. Kolomoyskyi proposed that the Ukrainian government "today is simply obliged to confiscate property ... of supporters of separatism (e.g.) ... UkrTeleCom ... (to form) a special company, in which shareholders are members of anti-terrorist operation, veterans, relatives of the victims. Why do some have to die for their country while the rich get richer?" UkrTeleCom is the owner of Ukrainian national telephone network and it belongs to Mr. Akhmetov.

July 6: Mr. Kolomoyskyi may visit Vienna (at least, some of his close affiliates were reported to be there), apparently, to meet Mr. Firtash. The reasons for such a meeting could be numerous: Mr. Kolomoyskyi purchased recently arrears from a bankrupt Ukrainian bank and came to discuss the terms of payment - in shares, if necessary - that Mr. Firtash owed. Apparently, with little success.

It should be added that the battalions funded by Mr. Kolomoyskyi were the prime force capturing Mariupol last month. This city is at the center of Mr. Akhmetov's business empire. The attack took place despite Mr. Akhmetov's plea to prevent military activity in the region.

Mr. Kolomoyskyi has pioneered the use of paramilitary formation to attain business means in Ukraine. Appealing to the confiscation of large property in favor of "veterans", he has made another step towards dismantling the "old" Ukraine.

P.S. July 11: The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is reported to have rejected Mr. Kolomoisky's request to provide arms (e.g. automatic grenade launchers and machine guns) to his battalions. Minister Geletey recommends Mr. Kolomoisky to negotiate this issue personally with President Poroshenko (see Geletey refuses to transfer weapons to the volunteer battalions, in Russian)

P.S.S. July 11: A blogger reports that some Sergey Krasnovsky has come to the separatists. According to the report, he has claimed representing "a large businessman" who expects the political structure of Ukraine to be radically changed in 2-3 weeks. Mr. Krasnovsky has sought opinion on what structure the Donbass leaders would agree upon (see Benya prepares a coup d'état, in Russian)

The report refers, apparently, to Mr. Kolomoisky. Knowing that Mr. Kolomoisky is a seasoned corporate raider, I have mulled a wild idea that he might plan to split the region he controls (Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, and Kharkiv) from the rest of Ukraine in the hope of signing a separate deal with Russian President Putin. The latest news is consistent with other information. First, rumors are that Mr. Kolomoisky's affiliates planned to meet with people linked to Mr. Putin in Kharkiv a few days ago but failed due to the change of leadership in Donetsk. Second, the interview given by Gennady Korban, the right-hand man of Mr. Kolomoisky, contains a paragraph of what the Kolomoisky's group considers to be the Putin's plan in Ukraine (see I do war and finance, in Russian.) Thus, the idea of Mr. Kolomoisky being a separatist may not be crazy after all.

Political activity and repression in Ukraine

Armed rebellion is a blunt instrument to resolve political differences within a nation but it becomes unavoidable when the opponents fail to resolve a conflict using non-violent methods of negotiation. Peaceful methods are preferable because they do not endanger the human life and do not destroy property and, hence, are less costly economically. Have they been fully employed to find a solution to the current problem with separatism in Ukraine?

To find answer to this question let consider the options. Negotiating through the elected representatives comes first to mind. The Verkhovna Rada (“Supreme Soviet” in Ukrainian) is the highest representative body in this country. It has seats for 450 deputies who were elected in 2012. Half of the deputies represent territories and the other half are appointed by the political parties that gain more than 5 percent of votes at the elections. Currently, 445 deputies have official mandates. Is their work sufficient to arrive at national consensus? The available evidence gives little hope for optimism.

Since February 2014 only about 300 deputies have registered for plenary sessions on average, which gives relatively low attendance rate of less than 70 percent. Participation is not uniformly distributed among delegates. The statistics reveals much higher abstention exactly for the representatives of eastern and southern regions such as Lugansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Crimea: for example, the participation rate of Crimean delegates varies between 10 and 30 percent. The real participation rate may be even lower. The voting pattern for 10 deputies from Crimea that I have studied is odd, for example, the voting system may register a deputy being both “absent” and “present” within short periods of time and no obvious reason. A casual look on the topics to be voted does not show specific political preferences. Potentially, non-participating deputies are voted for by somebody else. Low participation rate implies that the regions at the center of conflict are not properly represented in Rada. As a result, the Rada discussions tend towards denying the problem of separatism.

An early parliamentary election could make debates less biased but the circumstances do not seem to be favorable. First, a significant part of deputies – mostly the high-ranking members of the Party of Regions – do not appear in Rada literally fearing for their lives. For example, maverick deputy Oleg Tsaryov had even to resettle his family to Donbass facing death threats. His home in Dnipropetrovsk region was burnt and his other property was seized by the structures affiliated with Dnipropetrovsk governor. How to assure the security of separatist delegates is a question for Kyiv that has no answer. Second, Kyiv does not control Crimea, Lugansk, and Donetsk and, hence, the local leaders should consent to participating in elections. They do not. Finally, rumors circulate that a coalition of opposition factions in Rada and the government have agreed a deal to avoid an early election. (They say that the opposition abstains from criticizing President Poroshenko as part of the deal.) Therefore, Rada is not a likely platform to search for reconciliation in Ukraine.

Participation in local politics such as demonstrations or can mitigate the excesses of armed conflicts. Unfortunately, this venue is shut on both sides. Two issues – nationalistic and pacifistic – are not publicly debatable anymore. After the events of May 2 in Odessa, pro-Russian activists find dangerous to organize public rallies on the territory controlled by Kyiv. Pro-Ukrainian protesters avoid appearing on the streets of rebellious cities. Pacifists end up increasingly in the same position. For example, the religious procession for peace that was planned in Kyiv on June 22 was cancelled as clashes with pro-Ukrainian nationalists became imminent. In general, public debates in Ukraine become dangerously polarized. Any topic becomes analyzed on the subject of who will benefit from its resolution – the proponents of united Ukraine or separatists.

The plurality of opinions appears to be still tolerated on economic topics. This tolerance allows the opponents in civil conflict to find the areas of agreement. For example, the proponents of united Ukraine and separatists are united in their hatred towards corrupt officials or wily oligarchs. But does such an agreement have a chance to succeed in the modern Ukraine? The ubiquity of bribing and the preponderance of back-room dealings within Ukrainian elite witness to the contrary.

The review of political options available to the residents of Ukraine shows that peaceful venues of conflict resolution are largely closed. The political discourse degenerates to the binary choice between “united Ukraine” and “secession”, to which other options are subordinated. Given that economic issues are still within the limits of public debate, there is weak chance that the Ukrainians can come to the agreement on how the country should be governed. Unfortunately, the official Kyiv does not recognize the problem within its ranks. In the absence of political change, the civil war in Ukraine remains the only effective method to win in the debate.