It might sound provocative but the answer to this question is 'yes'. To see the logic of the argument one needs to know the superposition principle from physics and the concept of non-linear war introduced by writer Nathan Dubovitsky, aka Vladislav Surkov who is the most intellectual adviser to Russian President Putin.
The first principle states that the end result of an applied force may be very different from its intended consequence because it is the combined effect of ALL forces that matters. The second idea claims that the modern war is so complicated that each participant is better off pursuing his or her objectives independently from anybody rather than adhering to a stable coalition of allies. In short, the non-linear war is Hobbesian at its finest where friends can betray and enemies can join forces in an instant. Let apply the two concepts to the Ukrainian case.
As I have mentioned earlier (see Who controls the eastern Ukrainian separatists?), the Kremlin is not in hurry to help the rebels because it does not exercise full control over them. For example, while the Ukrainian military repeats that their opponents are extremely well equipped; Igor Strelkov, the field commander in Donetsk, complains about being overwhelmingly outgunned by his enemies. The two statements seem to contradict one another but they both can be true.
The front line reports constantly mention the mysterious "third force" that helps selectively the separatists but only at the time and in the place that it considers to be appropriate. This force is commonly associated with Russian special units but the reality can be more complicated. The "third force" may in itself be a complex combination of several independent forces applied with different objectives - exactly in compliance with the concept of non-linear war. Soldiers on the ground from the Ukrainian side suspect their commanders to share information about their movements with the enemy. The rebels report that the Ukrainian National Guard units fight with the Ukrainian Army while their opponents notice clashes among the rebel formations. Who is then fighting whom, under what circumstances and for which objectives?
To answer this question, one needs to establish a frame of reference to separate the dimension of forces. In my opinion, the most distinct interests lie within a two-coordinate frame formed by the idea of socialism/nationalism on one axis versus the idea of hierarchy/globalism measured on the other axis. Along the first line the Russian nationalists fight their Ukrainian counterparts and the leftists advance their opposing visions of 'social justice'. Along the second line the Russian, EU and US elites define their rankings within the global hierarchy of power. Then, it becomes visible that the Washington's insistence on downgrading the ranking of Russian elite (for their "meddling in the Ukrainian affairs") along one axis works towards raising the Ukrainian rebels' chances to succeed along the other axis.
The problem is that up to now Mr. Putin has worked against the rebels due to his deep-seated their distrust. Being a functionary who has climbed the career ladder under the condition of unswayed loyalty, he is psychologically unprepared to ally with charismatic 'grassroots' politicians. For him the leaders of rebellion are pesky upstarts who need to be constantly reminded of who is their real boss. This personal trait explains why the trailblazers who risked the most in the beginning (Messrs. Pushilin, Khodakovsky, possibly Boroday) are gradually replaced with retired security personnel like Mr. Antyufeev and why such charismatic field commanders as Messrs. Strelkov and Mozgovoy are allowed to lose in Slavyansk and Severodonetsk.
If not for the US intervention, the Ukrainian drama would most likely result in modest reshuffling of relative weights of individual members of Russo-Ukrainian elite. Roughly speaking, certain assets in Ukraine would change the ownership to better reflect the new power disposition after February 2014 and, possibly, Russia and Ukraine would agree on the joint management of Crimea.
The recent events, such as the Malasyan plane accident and the ruling of Hague Court on the expropriation of Yukos, have put significant downward pressure on the Russian elite. Figuratively speaking, Mr. Putin and his friends have been given a 'death card' regarding their ranking in the global hierarchy of elites. Being virtual outcasts, they cannot anymore cut a deal with their Ukrainian opponents who - in their wildest dreams - have already imagined themselves being promoted at the expense of defeated Russians. But there is a glitch. Facing a powerful attack from the top of global wealth pyramid, Mr. Putin and his circle are obliged to seek help from the bottom that is to join forces with nationalistic (Mr. Strelkov) or socialistic (Mr. Mozgovoy) field commanders in eastern Ukraine.
Thus, the current US policy of punishing Mr. Putin and his inner circle objectively strengthens the position of Ukrainian rebels.
The first principle states that the end result of an applied force may be very different from its intended consequence because it is the combined effect of ALL forces that matters. The second idea claims that the modern war is so complicated that each participant is better off pursuing his or her objectives independently from anybody rather than adhering to a stable coalition of allies. In short, the non-linear war is Hobbesian at its finest where friends can betray and enemies can join forces in an instant. Let apply the two concepts to the Ukrainian case.
As I have mentioned earlier (see Who controls the eastern Ukrainian separatists?), the Kremlin is not in hurry to help the rebels because it does not exercise full control over them. For example, while the Ukrainian military repeats that their opponents are extremely well equipped; Igor Strelkov, the field commander in Donetsk, complains about being overwhelmingly outgunned by his enemies. The two statements seem to contradict one another but they both can be true.
The front line reports constantly mention the mysterious "third force" that helps selectively the separatists but only at the time and in the place that it considers to be appropriate. This force is commonly associated with Russian special units but the reality can be more complicated. The "third force" may in itself be a complex combination of several independent forces applied with different objectives - exactly in compliance with the concept of non-linear war. Soldiers on the ground from the Ukrainian side suspect their commanders to share information about their movements with the enemy. The rebels report that the Ukrainian National Guard units fight with the Ukrainian Army while their opponents notice clashes among the rebel formations. Who is then fighting whom, under what circumstances and for which objectives?
To answer this question, one needs to establish a frame of reference to separate the dimension of forces. In my opinion, the most distinct interests lie within a two-coordinate frame formed by the idea of socialism/nationalism on one axis versus the idea of hierarchy/globalism measured on the other axis. Along the first line the Russian nationalists fight their Ukrainian counterparts and the leftists advance their opposing visions of 'social justice'. Along the second line the Russian, EU and US elites define their rankings within the global hierarchy of power. Then, it becomes visible that the Washington's insistence on downgrading the ranking of Russian elite (for their "meddling in the Ukrainian affairs") along one axis works towards raising the Ukrainian rebels' chances to succeed along the other axis.
The problem is that up to now Mr. Putin has worked against the rebels due to his deep-seated their distrust. Being a functionary who has climbed the career ladder under the condition of unswayed loyalty, he is psychologically unprepared to ally with charismatic 'grassroots' politicians. For him the leaders of rebellion are pesky upstarts who need to be constantly reminded of who is their real boss. This personal trait explains why the trailblazers who risked the most in the beginning (Messrs. Pushilin, Khodakovsky, possibly Boroday) are gradually replaced with retired security personnel like Mr. Antyufeev and why such charismatic field commanders as Messrs. Strelkov and Mozgovoy are allowed to lose in Slavyansk and Severodonetsk.
If not for the US intervention, the Ukrainian drama would most likely result in modest reshuffling of relative weights of individual members of Russo-Ukrainian elite. Roughly speaking, certain assets in Ukraine would change the ownership to better reflect the new power disposition after February 2014 and, possibly, Russia and Ukraine would agree on the joint management of Crimea.
The recent events, such as the Malasyan plane accident and the ruling of Hague Court on the expropriation of Yukos, have put significant downward pressure on the Russian elite. Figuratively speaking, Mr. Putin and his friends have been given a 'death card' regarding their ranking in the global hierarchy of elites. Being virtual outcasts, they cannot anymore cut a deal with their Ukrainian opponents who - in their wildest dreams - have already imagined themselves being promoted at the expense of defeated Russians. But there is a glitch. Facing a powerful attack from the top of global wealth pyramid, Mr. Putin and his circle are obliged to seek help from the bottom that is to join forces with nationalistic (Mr. Strelkov) or socialistic (Mr. Mozgovoy) field commanders in eastern Ukraine.
Thus, the current US policy of punishing Mr. Putin and his inner circle objectively strengthens the position of Ukrainian rebels.
1 comment:
Молодец! Отлично написал! Так держать. Всегда четаю.
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