Political activity and repression in Ukraine

Armed rebellion is a blunt instrument to resolve political differences within a nation but it becomes unavoidable when the opponents fail to resolve a conflict using non-violent methods of negotiation. Peaceful methods are preferable because they do not endanger the human life and do not destroy property and, hence, are less costly economically. Have they been fully employed to find a solution to the current problem with separatism in Ukraine?

To find answer to this question let consider the options. Negotiating through the elected representatives comes first to mind. The Verkhovna Rada (“Supreme Soviet” in Ukrainian) is the highest representative body in this country. It has seats for 450 deputies who were elected in 2012. Half of the deputies represent territories and the other half are appointed by the political parties that gain more than 5 percent of votes at the elections. Currently, 445 deputies have official mandates. Is their work sufficient to arrive at national consensus? The available evidence gives little hope for optimism.

Since February 2014 only about 300 deputies have registered for plenary sessions on average, which gives relatively low attendance rate of less than 70 percent. Participation is not uniformly distributed among delegates. The statistics reveals much higher abstention exactly for the representatives of eastern and southern regions such as Lugansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Crimea: for example, the participation rate of Crimean delegates varies between 10 and 30 percent. The real participation rate may be even lower. The voting pattern for 10 deputies from Crimea that I have studied is odd, for example, the voting system may register a deputy being both “absent” and “present” within short periods of time and no obvious reason. A casual look on the topics to be voted does not show specific political preferences. Potentially, non-participating deputies are voted for by somebody else. Low participation rate implies that the regions at the center of conflict are not properly represented in Rada. As a result, the Rada discussions tend towards denying the problem of separatism.

An early parliamentary election could make debates less biased but the circumstances do not seem to be favorable. First, a significant part of deputies – mostly the high-ranking members of the Party of Regions – do not appear in Rada literally fearing for their lives. For example, maverick deputy Oleg Tsaryov had even to resettle his family to Donbass facing death threats. His home in Dnipropetrovsk region was burnt and his other property was seized by the structures affiliated with Dnipropetrovsk governor. How to assure the security of separatist delegates is a question for Kyiv that has no answer. Second, Kyiv does not control Crimea, Lugansk, and Donetsk and, hence, the local leaders should consent to participating in elections. They do not. Finally, rumors circulate that a coalition of opposition factions in Rada and the government have agreed a deal to avoid an early election. (They say that the opposition abstains from criticizing President Poroshenko as part of the deal.) Therefore, Rada is not a likely platform to search for reconciliation in Ukraine.

Participation in local politics such as demonstrations or can mitigate the excesses of armed conflicts. Unfortunately, this venue is shut on both sides. Two issues – nationalistic and pacifistic – are not publicly debatable anymore. After the events of May 2 in Odessa, pro-Russian activists find dangerous to organize public rallies on the territory controlled by Kyiv. Pro-Ukrainian protesters avoid appearing on the streets of rebellious cities. Pacifists end up increasingly in the same position. For example, the religious procession for peace that was planned in Kyiv on June 22 was cancelled as clashes with pro-Ukrainian nationalists became imminent. In general, public debates in Ukraine become dangerously polarized. Any topic becomes analyzed on the subject of who will benefit from its resolution – the proponents of united Ukraine or separatists.

The plurality of opinions appears to be still tolerated on economic topics. This tolerance allows the opponents in civil conflict to find the areas of agreement. For example, the proponents of united Ukraine and separatists are united in their hatred towards corrupt officials or wily oligarchs. But does such an agreement have a chance to succeed in the modern Ukraine? The ubiquity of bribing and the preponderance of back-room dealings within Ukrainian elite witness to the contrary.

The review of political options available to the residents of Ukraine shows that peaceful venues of conflict resolution are largely closed. The political discourse degenerates to the binary choice between “united Ukraine” and “secession”, to which other options are subordinated. Given that economic issues are still within the limits of public debate, there is weak chance that the Ukrainians can come to the agreement on how the country should be governed. Unfortunately, the official Kyiv does not recognize the problem within its ranks. In the absence of political change, the civil war in Ukraine remains the only effective method to win in the debate.