The Russian factor in Ukrainian affairs

Russian actors in Ukraine can be represented as a triad consisting of the government (the Kremlin), national elite, and active commoners. Their actions do not necessarily point in the same direction. Various political issues at home and actors’ competing interests abroad add to the confusion creating the impression that Russia does not really pursue a well-defined policy in Ukraine.

The position of rank-and-file activists is the most straightforward: it is nationalistic. They see the war across the border as a fight for the unity of their nation. The eastern Ukrainian rebels are viewed as “our guys” who fight against “them.” Who are “they” is unimportant but, curiously, common perceptions avoid ethnic connotation. Some think that “they” are “fascists” or direct descendants of the western Ukrainian division “Galichina” formed in 1943 to support the German army. Others believe that “they” are local “puppets” operating on behalf of their American masters. Very few are of opinion that their opponents are true Ukrainian patriots who work towards building a new nation-state: in general, non-rebelling residents of Ukraine are seen either as compromised by weird ethnic prejudices or as subordinate to foreign interests.

Short history of grassroots activism in Russia suggests that it is not be a serious factor in Ukraine. There are stories of volunteers and non-lethal aid that leaks in Ukraine but they make the impression of being only marginally important. Yet, the power of public opinion that is firmly in favor of supporting the pro-Russian rebels is not to be underestimated: it is the force that the Kremlin has to listen to.

The Kremlin is commonly considered to be the principal actor on this scene but its conduct is somewhat too contradictory to support the claim. Obviously, Putin has crossed his personal Rubicon when he sanctioned the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Since then, he is obliged to stir troubles in Ukraine or to face retributions. However, the price of doing so is too high to believe in Putin’s enthusiasm. The Russian leader and his inner circle had comfortable living within the western-based financial system. If the collective West introduces sanctions what is perceived as Russia’s violation of established global conventions, that living would be imperiled. My interpretation of the time was that Putin had to annex the peninsula for the lack of better moves. After suppressing the pro-democratic movement of winter 2011-12, his power-base narrowed. Russian nationalists became the force to be reckoned with. Facing looming economic recession at home, Putin had to avoid the impression of losing in Ukraine for his political survival. Reestablishing formal control over a piece of “indigenous” Russian land, Putin hoped to please his key supporters. Besides, he faced another dilemma.

The Kremlin balancing between the nationalists who demanded the action and the West that insisted on preserving the post-war borders was further complicated with feeble but evident anti-oligarchic streak in the wave of protests in Kyiv. Annexing the Crimea, Russia effectively offered a lifeline to the Ukrainian oligarchy. Immediately, the Kyiv protesters switched attention from their campaign against corruption and nepotism – the two most detested features of Ukrainian oligarchic regime – to fighting the “enemy at the gate.” Thus, the Ukrainian oligarchs had the time to solidify their grip on power while the citizenry, under the banner of nationalism, rushed to form the territorial battalions of self-defense.

Across the border, the same deed spurred another wave of activism, this time from a nationalist part of the Russian elite. It should be noted that the so-called “green men” who supervised with arms the Crimean transition were volunteers sponsored by wealthy Russian businessmen like Konstantin Malofeev. After Crimea they moved to the eastern Ukraine (see From Crimea to Donbass) where local residents rose against the interim government in Kyiv seen in Donbass as nationalistic. While the resentment was local in nature, Russian volunteers with military background provided the very framework on the basis of which the local rebels have built their militia.

The flow of non-lethal supplies and funds from the same businessmen to purchase Ukrainian weaponry from the corrupt military followed but the numbers and effectiveness of weaponry that the rebel possess appear to exceed of what could be procured on the ground. Apparently, informal transfer of arms takes place on the Russian border. This cannot happen without the Kremlin’s approval but, again, I would not jump to conclusion that it puts its main stake on the rebellion.

It was obvious from the start that the uprising against the “Ukrainian values” together with the visible presence of Russian volunteers would inflame nationalistic passions in the rest of country. Predictably, Kyiv sent the army to restore control over the restive provinces. At first, Russia growled across the border with a military buildup. The military threat was driven by fear that Kyiv nipped the rebellion in the bud. In this case, the Kremlin would be exposed to the wrath of Russian nationalists for being “ineffective.” Closing eyes on the traffic of arms – and not necessarily of weaponry registered in Russia – the Kremlin minimized the fallout at home without inflaming too much the war in Ukraine.

The current situation in Kremlin is characterized with precarious balance between the need to keep the rebellion alive, the need to prevent apparently maverick groups of separatists to gain the upper hand, and the need to avoid western sanctions. The latter are particularly damaging to that part of Russian elite (e.g. investment bankers) that maintains close business relationships with the West.

Having described the key Russian forces that act in Ukraine, one can observe the direction in which they point in aggregate. First, the “hot” part of the conflict is not driven by Russia. It is directly proportional to the Ukrainian efforts to quell the rebellion. In this respect, the Russian objective is to match the strength of combatants. Second, the Kremlin plans to negotiate with the Ukrainian government using mostly economic levers such as requesting the advance payment for gas. Third, it tries to maneuver to avoid the western sanctions in order to satisfy the part of Russian elite most vulnerable to them but not at the expense of alienating Russian nationalists. The latter will continue to supply the rebels until they gain.