Who controls the eastern Ukrainian separatists?

Generally, the western media takes for granted that the eastern Ukrainian separatists operate as Kremlin stooges. It claims that their task is to provide informational coverage for the imminent Russian invasion in the region. While this hypothesis withstands the test of "who benefits" from the escalation of Ukrainian conflict, so do many other competing explanations, for example, Washington as often claimed in the Russian media. Having studied the style of Russian President Vladimir Putin, I venture to say that he looks more as a hostage of the ongoing drama rather than the man who calls the shots. To see why his options are very limited, let go backwards in time, to consider the key factors that led to the conflict, and evaluate Mr. Putin's actions within their context.

The interim results of political process in Ukraine show convincingly that the turmoil in this country was instigated by a local oligarchic rivalry that went out of control. The process started in December 2013 when billionaire Petro Poroshenko – who has not incidentally won the presidential election of May 25 – sponsored the establishment of a permanent opposition camp known as Maydan in Kyiv. The key demand of Maydan was to remove the then President Viktor Yanukovych from power on the grounds that he rejected the association agreement with the EU. The protesters claimed that the president was “overly pro-Russian” and, hence, not representative of the “Ukrainian values” that turned out to be explicitly anti-Russian. The message that “Ukraine is not Russia” and that the border between “Europe” and “Asia” lies on the eastern Ukrainian frontier dominated that discourse from the beginning.

Meanwhile, the average resident of Kyiv was not moved by the slogan. A few days later it appeared that the protest was going to fizzle for the lack of interest. Then, strange things started to happen as if a certain actor wanted to provide impetus to the confrontation. At first, the police used disproportional force against an innocuous - from the political perspective - demonstration. Then, low-key protest leaders were senselessly beaten by unknown thugs. In February, the mayhem came to the capital after mysterious snipers shot dead about a hundred of protesters and police alike. Yanukovich requested an international mediation that succeeded agreeing the peaceful power change within a year. The accord satisfied all parties except for the same mysterious force that, first, helped to remove security forces from the center and, second, prompted the radical wing of the protesters to capture the Parliament. President Yanukovich fled Kyiv and the key opposition group in the Parliament, that happened to be of the then jailed former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, formed an interim government.

The winning oligarchic faction of Poroshenko and Timoshenko announced that the Maydan had fulfilled its historical mission and should be immediately dismissed but they did not already fully control the situation. On one hand, a part of protesters believed that their interests – formed around the anti-Russian rhetoric – were not served. At the same time, Poroshenko and Timoshenko disagreed how to govern further. Poroshenko prevailed, apparently, through American mediation. Oligarchs did not need political cover anymore and, as a result, most powerful among them, such as Ihor Kolomoyskyi, became provincial governors endowed with sizable and legalized private armies that interpreted the national laws in the ways that suited them

On the other end of the spectrum, the losing oligarchic group – formed around the richest Ukrainian mogul Rinat Akhmetov – threw its collective hat in the ring by instigating pro-Russian protests in the eastern Ukraine. While the battle-cry in Kyiv was “who does not jump is a ‘moskal’ (a nickname for a Russian)”, the protesters in Donetsk shouted “against fascism and Bandera (a hero of Ukrainian nationalist movement)”. Both groups did not conceal that they received money from rivaling oligarchic groups.

Obviously, the wealthiest of both parts of the country saw the nationalistic flavor being subordinate to their main idea of using the proxy street battles to realign the structure of oligarchic governance in Ukraine. They saw participants on the ground as a paid-for crowd gathered to support the "seriousness" of their claims. It was surprising to discover that their convoluted plot resulted in unexpected contingencies: the actual groups of Russian and Ukrainian nationalists materialized slowly out of seemingly nowhere. Moreover, they managed to change the plot.

The first serious deviation happened in Crimea. While the Russian troops did indeed tip the balance of forces towards the annexation of peninsula by Russia, it was Russian nationalistic volunteers with the help of local sympathizers who started the process. The separatists gambled correctly that Putin would not dare to turn his back to their request for military assistance. The problem was that the Kremlin changed its power base after suppressing the liberal protests in Moscow in December 2011. As his new popular appeal became explicitly nationalistic, Putin could not disappoint his supporters by ignoring the Crimean roulette. However, the downside involved straining the relationship with the West, which displeased the Russian elite - the main group to whose interests Mr. Putin is to cater. After some hesitation, the Kremlin decided that the political benefit of annexing Crimea outweighed the cost of western sanctions. As a result, Crimea became another subject of the Russian Federation winning to Putin kudos from Russian nationalists. Luckily for him, the western sanctions turned out to be less biting than expected and, hence, the Kremlin fortune was good.

However, the pro-Russian volunteers in Crimea had bigger plans. Observing oligarchy-inspired protests in eastern Ukraine with anti-Ukrainian flavor, they decided to expand the scope by attempting ‘to liberate more of the Russian land’. The most determinate group moved to the city of Sloviansk and turned this locality into the flash point of the current anti-Ukrainian insurgency against the ‘junta’ as they call the interim government in Kyiv. The local sympathizers joined the efforts creating a sizable militia that became accountable neither to local Ukrainian oligarchy nor to the Kremlin. Moreover, a specific topic that frightens both the Ukrainian oligarchy and its Russian kin becomes more and more apparent. The nationalistic slogans prevailed in the Maydan but certain anti-oligarchic sentiment was felt. The eastern Ukrainian rebellion still centers around Russian nationalism but the appeal to social justice sounds more distinct in the area.

And, now, consider Mr. Putin's dilemma: he hears appeals to intervene to help his Russian brethren in Ukraine but is appalled to discover that they do not share his positive view of the Russian oligarchy. If he will not interfere and the rebellion is crushed, Russian nationalists will stop supporting him. If he intervenes assuring a quick victory of separatists, successful revolutionaries will appear at the door of largely oligarchic Russia. By and large, only a permanent torpid war in Ukraine satisfies Mr. Putin. But is such an unstable outcome viable for long?

So far, it is difficult to predict how the things will turn out in the eastern Ukraine but under all circumstances the outlook is gloomy for Mr. Putin.