Statistically, the post-Soviet leaders tend to have long tenures: e.g., Russian President Vladimir Putin has ruled his country as president or prime minister since 2000. At the same time, they are serious about organizing a regular procedure of asking to come to the polling stations. Apparently, the elites exhibit a “cargo cult” towards the electoral process. They find important being anointed by the crowd. Certainly, the electoral choice is pure fiction. If citizens turn out to be less loyal than expected and the ritual, called “election”, deviates from the prescribed script; the leaders find a way to tilt final result towards the right outcome.
Ukraine is not much different from her post-Soviet neighbors in the predictability of electoral results except for one thing: this is a cleft country. It has the two large groups that associate themselves with Russia and with the EU spearheaded, more or less, by Poland. As such, any single winner of the Ukrainian election is obliged to maneuver to satisfy the two camps or to risk being sidelined. Such maneuvering involves frequent political betrayals that have become the trademark of Ukrainian politics. As a result, the country has always been hardly governable hierarchically. Too many power brokers (including even local police officers or petty civil servants) have to come to the terms to put most straightforward decisions into action.
Since 1991, Ukraine witnessed 5 presidents with only one of them – Leonid Kuchma – serving two terms in 1994-2004. Twice presidents were either prevented to take the power or deposed. Both times this fate fell on Mr. Victor Yanukovich – in 2004 and 2014. Both times he was replaced with a protégé of pro-EU clan – Mr. Victor Yushchenko in 2004 and Mr. Petro Poroshenko in 2014.
The ascent of Mr. Poroshenko to power started in December 2013 when he became that mysterious financial sponsor who stood behind the opposition protest camp at Maidan. After Mr. Yanukovich, belonging to the pro-Russian faction, fled Kyiv in February 2014, the Parliament announced snap presidential election on May 26, 2014. The rumors circulated almost immediately that the pro-EU camp put its stake on Mr. Poroshenko to win the elections. There is reason to believe to these rumors as they made two other statements – on who would be elected as the Mayor of Kyiv and who would become the next Prime Minister – that turned out to be right.
As it is common in the post-Soviet practice, the election of May 26 was a pure formality. Somewhat outstanding from usual irregularities was the Parliament attempt to appoint Mr. Poroshenko as the acting president on the ground of being “most obvious winner by polls” two weeks ahead of the election. The main intrigue was not who is going to win but whether the election is decided at the first round or the second round will be necessary. Given the gravity of situation – the civil war raged already in the east of Ukraine – the outright victory was preferable and, voilà, Mr. Poroshenko won in the first round. Interestingly, none of his principal opponents showed intent to contest the results. In fact, they looked happier at the presidential inauguration than Mr. Poroshenko (the rumors even said that the President-elect got drunk and cursed his destiny the night before.)
What to expect after the elections is also obvious. Mr. Poroshenko cannot be a strong leader due to compelling circumstances. He has to get by with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk who represents a competing faction within the same pro-EU bloc. He has to support power ministers whom he did not appoint and whose importance has expanded due to the civil war. But most of all, President Poroshenko has to find a way to reign in local oligarchs who used the war as a pretext to build up their own private armies accountable to nobody but themselves.
Ukraine is not much different from her post-Soviet neighbors in the predictability of electoral results except for one thing: this is a cleft country. It has the two large groups that associate themselves with Russia and with the EU spearheaded, more or less, by Poland. As such, any single winner of the Ukrainian election is obliged to maneuver to satisfy the two camps or to risk being sidelined. Such maneuvering involves frequent political betrayals that have become the trademark of Ukrainian politics. As a result, the country has always been hardly governable hierarchically. Too many power brokers (including even local police officers or petty civil servants) have to come to the terms to put most straightforward decisions into action.
Since 1991, Ukraine witnessed 5 presidents with only one of them – Leonid Kuchma – serving two terms in 1994-2004. Twice presidents were either prevented to take the power or deposed. Both times this fate fell on Mr. Victor Yanukovich – in 2004 and 2014. Both times he was replaced with a protégé of pro-EU clan – Mr. Victor Yushchenko in 2004 and Mr. Petro Poroshenko in 2014.
The ascent of Mr. Poroshenko to power started in December 2013 when he became that mysterious financial sponsor who stood behind the opposition protest camp at Maidan. After Mr. Yanukovich, belonging to the pro-Russian faction, fled Kyiv in February 2014, the Parliament announced snap presidential election on May 26, 2014. The rumors circulated almost immediately that the pro-EU camp put its stake on Mr. Poroshenko to win the elections. There is reason to believe to these rumors as they made two other statements – on who would be elected as the Mayor of Kyiv and who would become the next Prime Minister – that turned out to be right.
As it is common in the post-Soviet practice, the election of May 26 was a pure formality. Somewhat outstanding from usual irregularities was the Parliament attempt to appoint Mr. Poroshenko as the acting president on the ground of being “most obvious winner by polls” two weeks ahead of the election. The main intrigue was not who is going to win but whether the election is decided at the first round or the second round will be necessary. Given the gravity of situation – the civil war raged already in the east of Ukraine – the outright victory was preferable and, voilà, Mr. Poroshenko won in the first round. Interestingly, none of his principal opponents showed intent to contest the results. In fact, they looked happier at the presidential inauguration than Mr. Poroshenko (the rumors even said that the President-elect got drunk and cursed his destiny the night before.)
What to expect after the elections is also obvious. Mr. Poroshenko cannot be a strong leader due to compelling circumstances. He has to get by with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk who represents a competing faction within the same pro-EU bloc. He has to support power ministers whom he did not appoint and whose importance has expanded due to the civil war. But most of all, President Poroshenko has to find a way to reign in local oligarchs who used the war as a pretext to build up their own private armies accountable to nobody but themselves.
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