I have hesitated for a while if anyone would be interested to see my analytic materials on the Ukrainian conflict but decided to take this responsibility and to promise publishing a summary of what is going on there regularly using a number of Ukrainian and Russian language sources (20-30).
Let me start a short historical summary of events. The current conflict started as a fight between the part of Ukrainian elite led by former President Viktor Yanukovych and the other part of same elite formally associated with former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. At first, the conflict evolved through political actions including appeals to the public. The key among them was to set an opposition camp in Kyiv (Maidan). As the stalemate continued, the conflict degenerated in armed confrontations. The latter culminated in deadly clashes - that left dozens of dead - in February 2014. Interestingly, the both public faces of the conflict - Mr. Yanukovych and Ms. Timoshenko - became effectively removed from the political space in its aftermath. Apparently, the two received "offers they couldn't refuse".
As the power in Kyiv changed hands, the losing side - associated with the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine - played the same old tune of pretending to cede if their interests went unrepresented in the new government but, suddenly, a new player intervened mixing the cards. Internal political rivalry in Russia made a weird turn pushing Russian President Vladimir Putin to interfere and to annex the former Ukrainian region of Crimea in March 2014. All of the sudden, the internal fight among Ukrainian oligarchy became unimportant. The conflict started to acquire nationalistic colors.
As opposing parts of Ukrainian oligarchy adapted to the new reality, a new shock happened. Several groups of armed pro-Russian nationalists, apparently involved in the Crimean takeover, moved into the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass, occupied several administrative buildings and proclaimed two independent republics in April 2014. On the other side, pro-Ukrainian nationalists responded with several massacres of their opponents in May 2014. It became obvious at this point that Ukraine could not avoid a full-fledged civil war of all against all.
In the beginning of June, several more or less autonomous groups of armed combatants have shown to be important. I list them below in the decreasing order of importance:
1) Ukrainian Army. It is a mixture of combat-ready and reserve troops. Their decision to battle or not can be reduced to cost-benefit analysis of "punishment-rewards" they can get, for example, troops less likely to have casualties (artillery, aviation) are more likely to fight. The moral depends on geographic affiliation: e.g., troops from the west of Ukraine are more likely to fight in the east of Ukraine than local soldiers.
2) Pro-Russian separatists. They represent another mixture of different groups. Most of them are volunteers. Not all of them are ready to fight outside of their localities. They lack the central command but coordinate activities.
3) Pro-Ukrainian paramilitary formations. They have been formed by local authorities with the permission from Kyiv. These formations are composed of volunteers and are directly subordinated to local power brokers. The coordination between the Ukrainian Army and the pro-Ukrainian formations is poor.
The border between Ukraine and Russia is now extremely porous as many frontier guards have left their positions. Donbass has sufficient stocks of ammunition and regular weapons to satisfy the needs of all combatants but the supply of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry can come mainly from Russia.
The economy of Ukraine is in poor shape and the country may default on its foreign debt this year. This topic requires a separate analysis.
Let me start a short historical summary of events. The current conflict started as a fight between the part of Ukrainian elite led by former President Viktor Yanukovych and the other part of same elite formally associated with former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. At first, the conflict evolved through political actions including appeals to the public. The key among them was to set an opposition camp in Kyiv (Maidan). As the stalemate continued, the conflict degenerated in armed confrontations. The latter culminated in deadly clashes - that left dozens of dead - in February 2014. Interestingly, the both public faces of the conflict - Mr. Yanukovych and Ms. Timoshenko - became effectively removed from the political space in its aftermath. Apparently, the two received "offers they couldn't refuse".
As the power in Kyiv changed hands, the losing side - associated with the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine - played the same old tune of pretending to cede if their interests went unrepresented in the new government but, suddenly, a new player intervened mixing the cards. Internal political rivalry in Russia made a weird turn pushing Russian President Vladimir Putin to interfere and to annex the former Ukrainian region of Crimea in March 2014. All of the sudden, the internal fight among Ukrainian oligarchy became unimportant. The conflict started to acquire nationalistic colors.
As opposing parts of Ukrainian oligarchy adapted to the new reality, a new shock happened. Several groups of armed pro-Russian nationalists, apparently involved in the Crimean takeover, moved into the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass, occupied several administrative buildings and proclaimed two independent republics in April 2014. On the other side, pro-Ukrainian nationalists responded with several massacres of their opponents in May 2014. It became obvious at this point that Ukraine could not avoid a full-fledged civil war of all against all.
In the beginning of June, several more or less autonomous groups of armed combatants have shown to be important. I list them below in the decreasing order of importance:
1) Ukrainian Army. It is a mixture of combat-ready and reserve troops. Their decision to battle or not can be reduced to cost-benefit analysis of "punishment-rewards" they can get, for example, troops less likely to have casualties (artillery, aviation) are more likely to fight. The moral depends on geographic affiliation: e.g., troops from the west of Ukraine are more likely to fight in the east of Ukraine than local soldiers.
2) Pro-Russian separatists. They represent another mixture of different groups. Most of them are volunteers. Not all of them are ready to fight outside of their localities. They lack the central command but coordinate activities.
3) Pro-Ukrainian paramilitary formations. They have been formed by local authorities with the permission from Kyiv. These formations are composed of volunteers and are directly subordinated to local power brokers. The coordination between the Ukrainian Army and the pro-Ukrainian formations is poor.
The border between Ukraine and Russia is now extremely porous as many frontier guards have left their positions. Donbass has sufficient stocks of ammunition and regular weapons to satisfy the needs of all combatants but the supply of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry can come mainly from Russia.
The economy of Ukraine is in poor shape and the country may default on its foreign debt this year. This topic requires a separate analysis.
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