The private armies in Ukraine

Prior to March 2014, there existed four separate military organizations in Ukraine: the army, the state security, the frontier guards, and the internal troops. The role of each of them was well defined. The army was responsible for protecting the country against external threats. State security gathered intelligence and conducted counterintelligence operations. The frontier guards controlled movement across the borders. The internal troops (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or police, units) were in charge of managing prisons and protecting the state order.

It should be noted that Ukraine had (and continues to have) a rather high level of corruption. Thus, it comes as no surprise that armed organizations in this country were also corrupt. Apart from fulfilling their direct functions, all of them - on larger or smaller scale - provided protection services to private citizens for the compensation that supplemented their (meager) salaries. Such services could include helping to settle financial accounts of shadow traders or to transfer the ownership of enterprises acquired in opaque deals. Apparently, unaccounted money flows were significant as the career in military organizations was in high demand and not because of its high social status.

The sudden loss of Crimea in March 2014 raised the question of who allowed such a thing to happen. First, the attention focused on the Ukrainian army that practically surrendered or switched sides joining the "aggressor's army" during the Russia's Crimea takeover. The passions flared in Kyiv and question of "who will protect us against the further Russian aggression” - as it was widely expected that Russia would continue encroaching on the Ukrainian territory - was high on the agenda. The state security was suspected of being filled with "Russian spies" and, hence, unreliable during a "patriotic war".

After deliberations, the interim government came to a rather non-intuitive decision. First, the level of "patriotism" became effectively synonymous to the amount on wealth that the officials responsible for keeping Ukraine "united" would lose if unfavorable contingencies happen. This curious conclusion led to unofficial understanding that it is only the richest people - known as "oligarchs" - who can keep the country united. Thus, they should be given direct control, through assuming the responsibilities of governor, of their respective strongholds. That explains the rise in number of oligarchs - to the detriment of professional politicians - among the Ukrainian governors today. Second, both the central authorities and regional bosses agreed to rely more on the “true Ukrainian patriots” that have been found within the ranks of anti-Yanukovich activists of Maidan, militant soccer fans, and "titushki", which was the nickname given to hired thugs with criminal past who did the dirty business of menacing political opponents before.

This decision resulted in the appearance of two other centers of military power. The Kyiv government organized the National Guards - 60,000 people strong - that formally belonged to the the Ministry of Internal Affairs in March 2014. Regional authorities formed “territorial self-defense battalions" with the strength of 500-1,000 men and accountable to nobody but the governors in April-May 2014. Most notable among the latter became Mr. Ihor Kolomoyskyi, the owner of the largest Ukrainian bank (Privatbank) and the new governor of rich Dnipropetrovsk region. Militant soccer fans of club “Dnipro” that he controls provided the core for his “territorial self-defense battalion Dnipro”, one of the most active formation of this type today. It was these militants that confronted the pro-Russian sympathizers in the city of Odessa. That confrontation ended up with many pro-Russians being burnt alive in the building where they tried to find a refuge.

The rise of separatist sentiments in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in April 2014 became a major threat to the national unity. The newly appointed governors of these regions, moguls Serhiy Taruta and Oleksandr Yefremov, attempted to trod the same path of setting self-defense battalions but their efforts were nipped by separatists in the bud. It was due largely to the influence - expressed behind the scenes - of another oligarch (and, at that time, the richest Ukrainian) Rinat Akhmetov who held his power-base in Mariupol, Donetsk region. Mr. Akhmetov did not take part in the Kyiv events and preferred to wait relying on his connections in the police and local state security. This position of neutrality worked to a certain moment, after which Mr. Akhmetov started to lose control over the separatists. His stance was further weakened by Mr. Kolomoyskyi who moved aggressively against the separatists. After his battalion Dnipro attacked the central police station in Mariupol on May 9, Mr. Akhmetov fled to Kyiv hoping to preserve of what was left of his business empire with the help of central government.

As the separatist movement gained strength and independence from local power brokers, the united front of Kyiv and oligarchs-governors turned against them with an odd combination of “old” and “new” military formations. Given that the pro-Ukrainian combatants have often competing interests, they do not get along well. There have been numerous complaints that they refuse to cooperate and even fight with one another during the ongoing civil war in the east of Ukraine known under the name of “anti-terrorist operation” (ATO) in Kyiv. I will talk about its successes and failures in what follows.