The Russian factor in Ukrainian affairs

Russian actors in Ukraine can be represented as a triad consisting of the government (the Kremlin), national elite, and active commoners. Their actions do not necessarily point in the same direction. Various political issues at home and actors’ competing interests abroad add to the confusion creating the impression that Russia does not really pursue a well-defined policy in Ukraine.

The position of rank-and-file activists is the most straightforward: it is nationalistic. They see the war across the border as a fight for the unity of their nation. The eastern Ukrainian rebels are viewed as “our guys” who fight against “them.” Who are “they” is unimportant but, curiously, common perceptions avoid ethnic connotation. Some think that “they” are “fascists” or direct descendants of the western Ukrainian division “Galichina” formed in 1943 to support the German army. Others believe that “they” are local “puppets” operating on behalf of their American masters. Very few are of opinion that their opponents are true Ukrainian patriots who work towards building a new nation-state: in general, non-rebelling residents of Ukraine are seen either as compromised by weird ethnic prejudices or as subordinate to foreign interests.

Short history of grassroots activism in Russia suggests that it is not be a serious factor in Ukraine. There are stories of volunteers and non-lethal aid that leaks in Ukraine but they make the impression of being only marginally important. Yet, the power of public opinion that is firmly in favor of supporting the pro-Russian rebels is not to be underestimated: it is the force that the Kremlin has to listen to.

The Kremlin is commonly considered to be the principal actor on this scene but its conduct is somewhat too contradictory to support the claim. Obviously, Putin has crossed his personal Rubicon when he sanctioned the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Since then, he is obliged to stir troubles in Ukraine or to face retributions. However, the price of doing so is too high to believe in Putin’s enthusiasm. The Russian leader and his inner circle had comfortable living within the western-based financial system. If the collective West introduces sanctions what is perceived as Russia’s violation of established global conventions, that living would be imperiled. My interpretation of the time was that Putin had to annex the peninsula for the lack of better moves. After suppressing the pro-democratic movement of winter 2011-12, his power-base narrowed. Russian nationalists became the force to be reckoned with. Facing looming economic recession at home, Putin had to avoid the impression of losing in Ukraine for his political survival. Reestablishing formal control over a piece of “indigenous” Russian land, Putin hoped to please his key supporters. Besides, he faced another dilemma.

The Kremlin balancing between the nationalists who demanded the action and the West that insisted on preserving the post-war borders was further complicated with feeble but evident anti-oligarchic streak in the wave of protests in Kyiv. Annexing the Crimea, Russia effectively offered a lifeline to the Ukrainian oligarchy. Immediately, the Kyiv protesters switched attention from their campaign against corruption and nepotism – the two most detested features of Ukrainian oligarchic regime – to fighting the “enemy at the gate.” Thus, the Ukrainian oligarchs had the time to solidify their grip on power while the citizenry, under the banner of nationalism, rushed to form the territorial battalions of self-defense.

Across the border, the same deed spurred another wave of activism, this time from a nationalist part of the Russian elite. It should be noted that the so-called “green men” who supervised with arms the Crimean transition were volunteers sponsored by wealthy Russian businessmen like Konstantin Malofeev. After Crimea they moved to the eastern Ukraine (see From Crimea to Donbass) where local residents rose against the interim government in Kyiv seen in Donbass as nationalistic. While the resentment was local in nature, Russian volunteers with military background provided the very framework on the basis of which the local rebels have built their militia.

The flow of non-lethal supplies and funds from the same businessmen to purchase Ukrainian weaponry from the corrupt military followed but the numbers and effectiveness of weaponry that the rebel possess appear to exceed of what could be procured on the ground. Apparently, informal transfer of arms takes place on the Russian border. This cannot happen without the Kremlin’s approval but, again, I would not jump to conclusion that it puts its main stake on the rebellion.

It was obvious from the start that the uprising against the “Ukrainian values” together with the visible presence of Russian volunteers would inflame nationalistic passions in the rest of country. Predictably, Kyiv sent the army to restore control over the restive provinces. At first, Russia growled across the border with a military buildup. The military threat was driven by fear that Kyiv nipped the rebellion in the bud. In this case, the Kremlin would be exposed to the wrath of Russian nationalists for being “ineffective.” Closing eyes on the traffic of arms – and not necessarily of weaponry registered in Russia – the Kremlin minimized the fallout at home without inflaming too much the war in Ukraine.

The current situation in Kremlin is characterized with precarious balance between the need to keep the rebellion alive, the need to prevent apparently maverick groups of separatists to gain the upper hand, and the need to avoid western sanctions. The latter are particularly damaging to that part of Russian elite (e.g. investment bankers) that maintains close business relationships with the West.

Having described the key Russian forces that act in Ukraine, one can observe the direction in which they point in aggregate. First, the “hot” part of the conflict is not driven by Russia. It is directly proportional to the Ukrainian efforts to quell the rebellion. In this respect, the Russian objective is to match the strength of combatants. Second, the Kremlin plans to negotiate with the Ukrainian government using mostly economic levers such as requesting the advance payment for gas. Third, it tries to maneuver to avoid the western sanctions in order to satisfy the part of Russian elite most vulnerable to them but not at the expense of alienating Russian nationalists. The latter will continue to supply the rebels until they gain.

The Ukrainian strain of nationalism

It is often stated that the Ukrainians only react to the Russian interference in their east whereas the causes of conflict are two-directional. The east of the country is predominantly concerned with the Ukrainian nationalism. The residents in the east complain that they are required to recognize the dominant status of the Ukrainian language and to accept as theirs such western Ukrainian heroes as Stepan Bandera. This complaint has merit.

The Ukrainian type of nationalism is peculiar. It proves its value building on the perceived inferiority of its “Russian brethren.” The title of a major book written by the former president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma – Why Ukraine is not Russia – introduces this argument in open. The main idea of the book is that the “Ukrainians” are more civilized than the “Russians” without defining the terms. Then, the author explains that as he compares different parts of Ukraine, he observes that the western Ukraine (Galicia) is, in his opinion, the most “European”, or developed, region. Its architecture is distinctly European that is similar to the architecture of adjacent Poland. Technologies are advanced. People are polite and support one another. On the other end of the geographic spectrum lies the eastern Ukraine (Donbass) that the author considers to be truly “Russian.” It has the same shoddy Soviet-type architecture like across the border. Its industries are dilapidated. People are rough and careless for one another. In short, Galicia represents for the author the most “European”, or civilized, part of the country when compared with Donbass, or the most “Asian”, backward, region.

The conclusion follows that to become truly “European”, the whole of Ukraine should become like Galicia. But what does it mean practically? The Ukrainian nationalism answers this question cunningly: ‘Become the Ukrainian. Speak Ukrainian like the residents of Galicia and behave as they do. Then, you will become as civilized as they are.’ The appeal of this simple answer is strong among the Ukrainian residents who already speak Ukrainian at home and, hence, do not face the cost of learning another language. But the urban dwellers and residents of predominantly Russian-speaking eastern provinces are more skeptical. They question what the benefit is changing their way of speaking and thinking. The Ukrainian nationalism replies: ‘Do not compare two worlds. The Russian culture might have its own attraction but do not forget that it was imposed upon you through the occupation. In reality, you are Ukrainians who have forgotten your culture under the influence of the Russian masters. Come back to become Europeans as we are. It might take time to learn the language but, in between, you can easily accept other Ukrainian values such as our national literary pieces, dress code, and our heroes.’ If the residents still hesitate rejecting the Russian culture, the Ukrainian nationalism condemns them either as unwelcome descendants of Russian colonists or as cultural “Asians” persisting in their incivility.

The argument of Ukrainian cultural superiority over the Russians forms the basis of political discourse in this country. It lies at the heart of Ukrainian desire to join every Western-led institution – be it WTO, EU, or NATO – at least ahead if not at exclusion of Russia even at the expense of its national interests. The problem with this argument is that it is flawed. Formally, it is based at two premises and a conclusion:

1)      Galicia speaks only Ukrainian and has specific values;

2)      Galicia is the most developed Ukrainian region;

3)      Therefore, other Ukrainian regions should speak only Ukrainian and to accept specifically Galician values to become developed.

The conclusion does not follow from the premises suggesting the non sequitur fallacy. Even accepting the fact that Galicia is the most developed Ukrainian region – other regions like Dnipropetrovsk or Odessa might be better candidates – the language and cultural values are unlikely causes of development as people in former European colonies (e.g. India or Algeria) who accepted the colonial language and the way of living can attest. A more plausible explanation is that Galicia was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, as such, it bears the signs of its colonial past that happened to be – in the eyes of Ukrainian nationalists – more glorious than in other Ukrainian regions.

In the time of peace, the Ukrainian strain of nationalism is not without certain charm in its promotion of “all-Ukrainian values.” Glorification of local songs or garments is an important and colorful part of local folklore. Its less benign features can be annoying but tolerable: being mocked as a ‘moskal’ is the worst treatment that the pro-Russian residents can expect for their allegiance to a different culture. However, in the time of war that has started after the Russia’s annexation of Crimea, such ridicule has quickly degenerated in something more menacing – the dehumanization by Ukrainian nationalists of their opponents.

Creeping decentralization of Ukraine

While looking for the next topic to consider, I have come upon a curious post that attracted my attention. Certain contributor to Facebook, Borys Filatov, wrote addressing to unknown persons in Kyiv “Do not forget that we've got a real decentralization here”. Even though Mr. Filatov qualified his statement adding “Within the framework of a unified Ukraine”, I interpret this incident as a serious indication that this country is in the process of imploding for internal causes.

There are two reasons to come to this conclusion. First, Mr. Filatov is a deputy governor of Dnipropetrovsk region and his opinion is likely to be supported by Dnipropetrovsk governor Ihor Kolomoyskyi. Second, the phrase was uttered in the context of a financial conflict that revolved around the question of who controls the financial flows in a large part of Ukrainian territory stretching from Odessa to Dnipropetrovsk. This is exactly the area that was formerly called “Novorossiya” and which is largely pro-Russian.

The conflict itself needs to be explored in more details. Certain Georgy Yaroshenko arrived in Dnipropetrovsk and explained to the custom brokers – invited by the local office of Ukrainian security service – how to pay bribes to avoid problems with custom authorities. Such a meeting itself was not extraordinary in the local context as Ukraine is known to be a highly corrupt country. However, the reaction of local authorities was shocking given the political positioning and personality of Mr. Kolomoyskyi.

Arguably, Mr. Kolomoyskyi is the most active participant in the “anti-terrorist operation” (ATO) against the pro-Russian separatists. He is known for organizing several “self-defense battalions” paid for with his own funds and actively involved in the ATO combat operations. Incidentally, Mr. Kolomoyskyi runs Privat Group that is known for its aggressive hostile takeovers, in which Mr. Filatov presumably took part as a lawyer.

Given that Mr. Yaroshenko belongs to the group run by Mayor of Kyiv Vitali Klitschko who happens to be the key political ally of President Petro Poroshenko, the phrase “we've got a real decentralization here” acquires particularly menacing sense. With this phrase, Governor Kolomoyskyi states that he does not consider necessary to share money originating in Novorossiya with the central authorities. It is even more interesting that his team considers appropriate to use their fighting against “separatism” as an argument in their battle against Kyiv. Essentially, Kyiv is asked to leave Dnipropetrovsk alone or to face a popular revolution against "corrupt practices."

As a result of this demarche, the central authority finds itself in a no-win situation. If Kyiv denounces Mr. Yaroshenko and the practices he represents, Mr. Kolomoyskyi succeeds in his hostile takeover of financial flows from illegal custom operations. Then, because such operations are highly lucrative (some say that legal export-import trades are close to be impossible to do), he will make a fortune that pays back for his war expenses. If Kyiv sanctions Mr. Kolomoyskyi, it will lose a powerful ally who is in a position to stall the ATO in Donbass.

From my perspective, I find Mr. Kolomoyskyi’s covert coup being as much separatist to the idea of “unified Ukraine” as the battles waged in the fields by Donbass militias. If this tendency persists, other governors may wonder if they should stop sharing with Kyiv in largesse as well. Luckily, they have now “self-defense battalions” to show people organizing meetings with the help of Ukrainian security service who are the boss there.

The private armies in Ukraine

Prior to March 2014, there existed four separate military organizations in Ukraine: the army, the state security, the frontier guards, and the internal troops. The role of each of them was well defined. The army was responsible for protecting the country against external threats. State security gathered intelligence and conducted counterintelligence operations. The frontier guards controlled movement across the borders. The internal troops (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or police, units) were in charge of managing prisons and protecting the state order.

It should be noted that Ukraine had (and continues to have) a rather high level of corruption. Thus, it comes as no surprise that armed organizations in this country were also corrupt. Apart from fulfilling their direct functions, all of them - on larger or smaller scale - provided protection services to private citizens for the compensation that supplemented their (meager) salaries. Such services could include helping to settle financial accounts of shadow traders or to transfer the ownership of enterprises acquired in opaque deals. Apparently, unaccounted money flows were significant as the career in military organizations was in high demand and not because of its high social status.

The sudden loss of Crimea in March 2014 raised the question of who allowed such a thing to happen. First, the attention focused on the Ukrainian army that practically surrendered or switched sides joining the "aggressor's army" during the Russia's Crimea takeover. The passions flared in Kyiv and question of "who will protect us against the further Russian aggression” - as it was widely expected that Russia would continue encroaching on the Ukrainian territory - was high on the agenda. The state security was suspected of being filled with "Russian spies" and, hence, unreliable during a "patriotic war".

After deliberations, the interim government came to a rather non-intuitive decision. First, the level of "patriotism" became effectively synonymous to the amount on wealth that the officials responsible for keeping Ukraine "united" would lose if unfavorable contingencies happen. This curious conclusion led to unofficial understanding that it is only the richest people - known as "oligarchs" - who can keep the country united. Thus, they should be given direct control, through assuming the responsibilities of governor, of their respective strongholds. That explains the rise in number of oligarchs - to the detriment of professional politicians - among the Ukrainian governors today. Second, both the central authorities and regional bosses agreed to rely more on the “true Ukrainian patriots” that have been found within the ranks of anti-Yanukovich activists of Maidan, militant soccer fans, and "titushki", which was the nickname given to hired thugs with criminal past who did the dirty business of menacing political opponents before.

This decision resulted in the appearance of two other centers of military power. The Kyiv government organized the National Guards - 60,000 people strong - that formally belonged to the the Ministry of Internal Affairs in March 2014. Regional authorities formed “territorial self-defense battalions" with the strength of 500-1,000 men and accountable to nobody but the governors in April-May 2014. Most notable among the latter became Mr. Ihor Kolomoyskyi, the owner of the largest Ukrainian bank (Privatbank) and the new governor of rich Dnipropetrovsk region. Militant soccer fans of club “Dnipro” that he controls provided the core for his “territorial self-defense battalion Dnipro”, one of the most active formation of this type today. It was these militants that confronted the pro-Russian sympathizers in the city of Odessa. That confrontation ended up with many pro-Russians being burnt alive in the building where they tried to find a refuge.

The rise of separatist sentiments in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in April 2014 became a major threat to the national unity. The newly appointed governors of these regions, moguls Serhiy Taruta and Oleksandr Yefremov, attempted to trod the same path of setting self-defense battalions but their efforts were nipped by separatists in the bud. It was due largely to the influence - expressed behind the scenes - of another oligarch (and, at that time, the richest Ukrainian) Rinat Akhmetov who held his power-base in Mariupol, Donetsk region. Mr. Akhmetov did not take part in the Kyiv events and preferred to wait relying on his connections in the police and local state security. This position of neutrality worked to a certain moment, after which Mr. Akhmetov started to lose control over the separatists. His stance was further weakened by Mr. Kolomoyskyi who moved aggressively against the separatists. After his battalion Dnipro attacked the central police station in Mariupol on May 9, Mr. Akhmetov fled to Kyiv hoping to preserve of what was left of his business empire with the help of central government.

As the separatist movement gained strength and independence from local power brokers, the united front of Kyiv and oligarchs-governors turned against them with an odd combination of “old” and “new” military formations. Given that the pro-Ukrainian combatants have often competing interests, they do not get along well. There have been numerous complaints that they refuse to cooperate and even fight with one another during the ongoing civil war in the east of Ukraine known under the name of “anti-terrorist operation” (ATO) in Kyiv. I will talk about its successes and failures in what follows.

On the Ukrainian presidential election of May 2014

Statistically, the post-Soviet leaders tend to have long tenures: e.g., Russian President Vladimir Putin has ruled his country as president or prime minister since 2000. At the same time, they are serious about organizing a regular procedure of asking to come to the polling stations. Apparently, the elites exhibit a “cargo cult” towards the electoral process. They find important being anointed by the crowd. Certainly, the electoral choice is pure fiction. If citizens turn out to be less loyal than expected and the ritual, called “election”, deviates from the prescribed script; the leaders find a way to tilt final result towards the right outcome.

Ukraine is not much different from her post-Soviet neighbors in the predictability of electoral results except for one thing: this is a cleft country. It has the two large groups that associate themselves with Russia and with the EU spearheaded, more or less, by Poland. As such, any single winner of the Ukrainian election is obliged to maneuver to satisfy the two camps or to risk being sidelined. Such maneuvering involves frequent political betrayals that have become the trademark of Ukrainian politics. As a result, the country has always been hardly governable hierarchically. Too many power brokers (including even local police officers or petty civil servants) have to come to the terms to put most straightforward decisions into action.

Since 1991, Ukraine witnessed 5 presidents with only one of them – Leonid Kuchma – serving two terms in 1994-2004. Twice presidents were either prevented to take the power or deposed. Both times this fate fell on Mr. Victor Yanukovich – in 2004 and 2014. Both times he was replaced with a protégé of pro-EU clan – Mr. Victor Yushchenko in 2004 and Mr. Petro Poroshenko in 2014.

The ascent of Mr. Poroshenko to power started in December 2013 when he became that mysterious financial sponsor who stood behind the opposition protest camp at Maidan. After Mr. Yanukovich, belonging to the pro-Russian faction, fled Kyiv in February 2014, the Parliament announced snap presidential election on May 26, 2014. The rumors circulated almost immediately that the pro-EU camp put its stake on Mr. Poroshenko to win the elections. There is reason to believe to these rumors as they made two other statements – on who would be elected as the Mayor of Kyiv and who would become the next Prime Minister – that turned out to be right.

As it is common in the post-Soviet practice, the election of May 26 was a pure formality. Somewhat outstanding from usual irregularities was the Parliament attempt to appoint Mr. Poroshenko as the acting president on the ground of being “most obvious winner by polls” two weeks ahead of the election. The main intrigue was not who is going to win but whether the election is decided at the first round or the second round will be necessary. Given the gravity of situation – the civil war raged already in the east of Ukraine – the outright victory was preferable and, voilà, Mr. Poroshenko won in the first round. Interestingly, none of his principal opponents showed intent to contest the results. In fact, they looked happier at the presidential inauguration than Mr. Poroshenko (the rumors even said that the President-elect got drunk and cursed his destiny the night before.)

What to expect after the elections is also obvious. Mr. Poroshenko cannot be a strong leader due to compelling circumstances. He has to get by with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk who represents a competing faction within the same pro-EU bloc. He has to support power ministers whom he did not appoint and whose importance has expanded due to the civil war. But most of all, President Poroshenko has to find a way to reign in local oligarchs who used the war as a pretext to build up their own private armies accountable to nobody but themselves.

The causes of Ukrainian civil war

I have hesitated for a while if anyone would be interested to see my analytic materials on the Ukrainian conflict but decided to take this responsibility and to promise publishing a summary of what is going on there regularly using a number of Ukrainian and Russian language sources (20-30).

Let me start a short historical summary of events. The current conflict started as a fight between the part of Ukrainian elite led by former President Viktor Yanukovych and the other part of same elite formally associated with former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. At first, the conflict evolved through political actions including appeals to the public. The key among them was to set an opposition camp in Kyiv (Maidan). As the stalemate continued, the conflict degenerated in armed confrontations. The latter culminated in deadly clashes - that left dozens of dead - in February 2014. Interestingly, the both public faces of the conflict - Mr. Yanukovych and Ms. Timoshenko - became effectively removed from the political space in its aftermath. Apparently, the two received "offers they couldn't refuse".

As the power in Kyiv changed hands, the losing side - associated with the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine - played the same old tune of pretending to cede if their interests went unrepresented in the new government but, suddenly, a new player intervened mixing the cards. Internal political rivalry in Russia made a weird turn pushing Russian President Vladimir Putin to interfere and to annex the former Ukrainian region of Crimea in March 2014. All of the sudden, the internal fight among Ukrainian oligarchy became unimportant. The conflict started to acquire nationalistic colors.

As opposing parts of Ukrainian oligarchy adapted to the new reality, a new shock happened. Several groups of armed pro-Russian nationalists, apparently involved in the Crimean takeover, moved into the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass, occupied several administrative buildings and proclaimed two independent republics in April 2014. On the other side, pro-Ukrainian nationalists responded with several massacres of their opponents in May 2014. It became obvious at this point that Ukraine could not avoid a full-fledged civil war of all against all.

In the beginning of June, several more or less autonomous groups of armed combatants have shown to be important. I list them below in the decreasing order of importance:

1) Ukrainian Army. It is a mixture of combat-ready and reserve troops. Their decision to battle or not can be reduced to cost-benefit analysis of "punishment-rewards" they can get, for example, troops less likely to have casualties (artillery, aviation) are more likely to fight. The moral depends on geographic affiliation: e.g., troops from the west of Ukraine are more likely to fight in the east of Ukraine than local soldiers.
2) Pro-Russian separatists. They represent another mixture of different groups. Most of them are volunteers. Not all of them are ready to fight outside of their localities. They lack the central command but coordinate activities.
3) Pro-Ukrainian paramilitary formations. They have been formed by local authorities with the permission from Kyiv. These formations are composed of volunteers and are directly subordinated to local power brokers. The coordination between the Ukrainian Army and the pro-Ukrainian formations is poor.

The border between Ukraine and Russia is now extremely porous as many frontier guards have left their positions. Donbass has sufficient stocks of ammunition and regular weapons to satisfy the needs of all combatants but the supply of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry can come mainly from Russia.

The economy of Ukraine is in poor shape and the country may default on its foreign debt this year. This topic requires a separate analysis.

Who controls the eastern Ukrainian separatists?

Generally, the western media takes for granted that the eastern Ukrainian separatists operate as Kremlin stooges. It claims that their task is to provide informational coverage for the imminent Russian invasion in the region. While this hypothesis withstands the test of "who benefits" from the escalation of Ukrainian conflict, so do many other competing explanations, for example, Washington as often claimed in the Russian media. Having studied the style of Russian President Vladimir Putin, I venture to say that he looks more as a hostage of the ongoing drama rather than the man who calls the shots. To see why his options are very limited, let go backwards in time, to consider the key factors that led to the conflict, and evaluate Mr. Putin's actions within their context.

The interim results of political process in Ukraine show convincingly that the turmoil in this country was instigated by a local oligarchic rivalry that went out of control. The process started in December 2013 when billionaire Petro Poroshenko – who has not incidentally won the presidential election of May 25 – sponsored the establishment of a permanent opposition camp known as Maydan in Kyiv. The key demand of Maydan was to remove the then President Viktor Yanukovych from power on the grounds that he rejected the association agreement with the EU. The protesters claimed that the president was “overly pro-Russian” and, hence, not representative of the “Ukrainian values” that turned out to be explicitly anti-Russian. The message that “Ukraine is not Russia” and that the border between “Europe” and “Asia” lies on the eastern Ukrainian frontier dominated that discourse from the beginning.

Meanwhile, the average resident of Kyiv was not moved by the slogan. A few days later it appeared that the protest was going to fizzle for the lack of interest. Then, strange things started to happen as if a certain actor wanted to provide impetus to the confrontation. At first, the police used disproportional force against an innocuous - from the political perspective - demonstration. Then, low-key protest leaders were senselessly beaten by unknown thugs. In February, the mayhem came to the capital after mysterious snipers shot dead about a hundred of protesters and police alike. Yanukovich requested an international mediation that succeeded agreeing the peaceful power change within a year. The accord satisfied all parties except for the same mysterious force that, first, helped to remove security forces from the center and, second, prompted the radical wing of the protesters to capture the Parliament. President Yanukovich fled Kyiv and the key opposition group in the Parliament, that happened to be of the then jailed former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, formed an interim government.

The winning oligarchic faction of Poroshenko and Timoshenko announced that the Maydan had fulfilled its historical mission and should be immediately dismissed but they did not already fully control the situation. On one hand, a part of protesters believed that their interests – formed around the anti-Russian rhetoric – were not served. At the same time, Poroshenko and Timoshenko disagreed how to govern further. Poroshenko prevailed, apparently, through American mediation. Oligarchs did not need political cover anymore and, as a result, most powerful among them, such as Ihor Kolomoyskyi, became provincial governors endowed with sizable and legalized private armies that interpreted the national laws in the ways that suited them

On the other end of the spectrum, the losing oligarchic group – formed around the richest Ukrainian mogul Rinat Akhmetov – threw its collective hat in the ring by instigating pro-Russian protests in the eastern Ukraine. While the battle-cry in Kyiv was “who does not jump is a ‘moskal’ (a nickname for a Russian)”, the protesters in Donetsk shouted “against fascism and Bandera (a hero of Ukrainian nationalist movement)”. Both groups did not conceal that they received money from rivaling oligarchic groups.

Obviously, the wealthiest of both parts of the country saw the nationalistic flavor being subordinate to their main idea of using the proxy street battles to realign the structure of oligarchic governance in Ukraine. They saw participants on the ground as a paid-for crowd gathered to support the "seriousness" of their claims. It was surprising to discover that their convoluted plot resulted in unexpected contingencies: the actual groups of Russian and Ukrainian nationalists materialized slowly out of seemingly nowhere. Moreover, they managed to change the plot.

The first serious deviation happened in Crimea. While the Russian troops did indeed tip the balance of forces towards the annexation of peninsula by Russia, it was Russian nationalistic volunteers with the help of local sympathizers who started the process. The separatists gambled correctly that Putin would not dare to turn his back to their request for military assistance. The problem was that the Kremlin changed its power base after suppressing the liberal protests in Moscow in December 2011. As his new popular appeal became explicitly nationalistic, Putin could not disappoint his supporters by ignoring the Crimean roulette. However, the downside involved straining the relationship with the West, which displeased the Russian elite - the main group to whose interests Mr. Putin is to cater. After some hesitation, the Kremlin decided that the political benefit of annexing Crimea outweighed the cost of western sanctions. As a result, Crimea became another subject of the Russian Federation winning to Putin kudos from Russian nationalists. Luckily for him, the western sanctions turned out to be less biting than expected and, hence, the Kremlin fortune was good.

However, the pro-Russian volunteers in Crimea had bigger plans. Observing oligarchy-inspired protests in eastern Ukraine with anti-Ukrainian flavor, they decided to expand the scope by attempting ‘to liberate more of the Russian land’. The most determinate group moved to the city of Sloviansk and turned this locality into the flash point of the current anti-Ukrainian insurgency against the ‘junta’ as they call the interim government in Kyiv. The local sympathizers joined the efforts creating a sizable militia that became accountable neither to local Ukrainian oligarchy nor to the Kremlin. Moreover, a specific topic that frightens both the Ukrainian oligarchy and its Russian kin becomes more and more apparent. The nationalistic slogans prevailed in the Maydan but certain anti-oligarchic sentiment was felt. The eastern Ukrainian rebellion still centers around Russian nationalism but the appeal to social justice sounds more distinct in the area.

And, now, consider Mr. Putin's dilemma: he hears appeals to intervene to help his Russian brethren in Ukraine but is appalled to discover that they do not share his positive view of the Russian oligarchy. If he will not interfere and the rebellion is crushed, Russian nationalists will stop supporting him. If he intervenes assuring a quick victory of separatists, successful revolutionaries will appear at the door of largely oligarchic Russia. By and large, only a permanent torpid war in Ukraine satisfies Mr. Putin. But is such an unstable outcome viable for long?

So far, it is difficult to predict how the things will turn out in the eastern Ukraine but under all circumstances the outlook is gloomy for Mr. Putin.